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THE EQUAL ACCESS CONTROVERSY: A BATTLE FOR
FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN PUBLIC
SECONDARY SCHOOLS
MICHAEL D. ROUSE
T HE LEVEL of first amendment protection extended to religious
speech has never been clearly defined. The establishment clause
"prohibits Congress and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
States from passing any law 'respecting an establishment of reli-
gion."" However, as Chief Justice Burger once observed, "the precise
contours of this prohibition remain unclear." ' 2 Nevertheless, Chief
Justice Burger was able to state unequivocally that "it is common
ground that nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the state to
suppress a person's speech merely because the content of the speech is
religious in character." 3
In Mergens v. Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools,4 the United States Supreme Court has an opportunity to ar-
ticulate the extent to which the first amendment protects religious
speech. The Court must decide whether and to what extent student-
initiated, voluntary religious organizations have a right to meet on
public secondary school campuses. In Mergens, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that when other student groups are permit-
ted to use school facilities, religious student groups cannot be denied
access to the school for their meetings.' In Garnett v. Renton School
District No. 403,6 however, the Ninth Circuit held that religious stu-
dent groups can be prohibited from meeting on school premises.
In Widmar v. Vincent,7 the Supreme Court held that the free speech
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment8 guarantee college
1. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 552 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting).
2. Id.
3. Id. (emphasis in original).
4. 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
5. Id. at 1079.
6. 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16,
1989) (No. 89-641).
7. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
8. Id. at 276-77. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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student religious organizations the right to use university facilities if
the university permits secular student groups to use its facilities. Un-
der the facts before it, the Court found no establishment clause prohi-
bition against an equal access policy. The Court has yet to address the
constitutionality of an equal access policy on the high school level.
Congress attempted to resolve the issue through passage of the Equal
Access Act (EAA) in 1984. 9
This Comment examines the Mergens and Garnett decisions, ana-
lyzes the applicability of the EAA in each case, and discusses the es-
tablishment clause concerns presented when a school seeks to
implement an equal access policy. The Comment then explores the
boundaries of high school students' free exercise and free speech
rights. In conclusion, the Comment suggests a first amendment ap-
proach that would result in the Court's upholding the right of equal
access for high school student religious groups. Under this approach,
the Comment argues, the establishment clause does not prohibit such
a result and in fact, the free speech clause requires it. In short, the
author contends that extending Widmar to the high school level would
resolve any equal access controversy.
I. WIDMAR V. VINCENT
In 1977, the University of Missouri at Kansas City prohibited a re-
ligious student group named Cornerstone from meeting on campus
"for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."' 0 Members
of the student group filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri," alleging that "the University's dis-
crimination against religious activity and discussion violated their
rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States." 2 The district court rejected the students'
claims, finding that the establishment clause required the University to
deny the group access.' 3 The court held that the religious speech by the
students was entitled to less constitutional protection than other types
of expression.1 4
9. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1984); see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
10. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981).
11. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
12. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 266.
13. Chess, 480 F. Supp. at 916.
14. Id. at 918.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 5
The court held the University's policy to be a content-based discrimi-
nation against religious speech without any compelling justification.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 16 Justice Powell,
writing for the eight-to-one majority, agreed with the Eighth Circuit,
stating: "Having created a forum generally open to student groups,
the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious
speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that
a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the Univer-
sity is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards."17
The Court rejected the University's argument that the establishment
clause provided the basis for its compelling interest of strict separation
of church and state. Although the University's compliance with con-
stitutional requirements could have been considered "compelling,"
the Court held that "[ilt does not follow, however, that an 'equal ac-
cess policy' would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment
Clause cases." 8
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 9 the Supreme Court set forth the appropri-
ate framework to guide courts considering a possible establishment
clause violation:
Every analysis in this area must begin with the consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three
such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' '20
15. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981). The Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that an equal
access policy failed the "effect" prong of the Lemon test:
We cannot agree, however, that such a policy would have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion. Rather, it would have the primary effect of advancing the Universi-
ty's admittedly secular purpose-to develop students' social and cultural awareness as
well as [their] intellectual curiosity. It would simply permit students to put their relig-
ious ideas and practices in competition with the ideas and practices of other groups,
religious or secular.
Id. at 1317 (quotation omitted).
16. Widmar v. Vincent, 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
17. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
18. Id. at 271.
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). The Lemon test has been the subject of much criticism
since its adoption. See, e.g., County of Allegeny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct.
3086, 3134 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1990]
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The Widmar Court applied the Lemon test in deciding the constitu-
tionality of the University's equal access policy. The Court held that
"two prongs of the test are clearly met." ' 2' The Court concluded that
an equal access policy, including nondiscrimination against religious
speech, would have a secular purpose and avoid government entangle-
ment with religion. 22 With regard to the policy's primary effect, the
Court stated: "The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has
opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is
whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their
speech."23 The Court was "unpersuaded that the primary effect of the
public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance
religion. ' 24 The Court held that a state university, "having created a
forum generally open to students," may not discriminate against stu-
dent groups desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and dis-
cussion .25
The Court conceded that access to the University's facilities could
foreseeably yield benefits to the religious group, but that these would
be "merely incidental" benefits which would not constitute a "pri-
mary advancement" of religion. 26 The Court grounded this determina-
tion on two premises. First, an equal access policy "would no more
commit the University ... to religious goals" than it was already
"'committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society,
the Young Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to use its
facilities." ' 27 Second, the presence of a large number of campus stu-
dent groups, resulting in "a broad class of nonreligious as well as re-
ligious speakers," indicated that the equal access policy had a secular
effect, from which all groups benefitted. 28 The Court stated:
If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits
to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police
and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will
dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals
21. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
22. Id. at 271-72.
23. Id. at 273.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 277.
26. Id. at 273.
27. Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
28. ld. The University recognized over 100 student groups.
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that the advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary
effect."29
Thus, since 1981, the Court has recognized the constitutional right of
university religious groups to meet on campus, provided secular
groups can do so as well.
II. THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT30
In 1984, Congress passed the EAA to prohibit discriminatory treat-
ment of public high school "noncurriculum related student groups." 3'
Under the EAA, if a public high school allows one or more noncurri-
culum-related student groups to meet on campus, it may not discrimi-
nate against a similar group of students on the basis of the "religious,
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meet-
ings." '3 2 A "limited open forum" is created even if only one noncurri-
culum-related student group is allowed access to school facilities.
29. Id. at 274-75 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976)).
The Court also rejected the University's argument that since Missouri had gone further than the
Federal Constitution in "proscribing indirect state support of religion," it had a "compelling
interest in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution." Id. at 275.
The Court could find no support in Missouri case law to support the argument. Moreover, the
Court noted the "special constitutional solitude" of the students' free speech rights:
[Tihe state interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of church and State
than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-
is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as
well. In this constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State's interest as
sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against respondents'
religious speech.
Id. at 276.
30. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1984). The Equal Access Act provides in relevant part:
Section 4071: (a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access
or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philo-
sophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such school
grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
(c) Schools [sic] shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to
conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides
that-() the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated; (2) there is no sponsorship of
the meeting by the school, the government, or its agents or employees; (3) employees
or agents of the school or government are present at the religious meetings only in a
nonparticipatory capacity; (4) the meeting does not materially and substantially inter-
fere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and (5) non-
school persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend activities of
student groups.
31. Id. § 4071(b).
32. Id. § 4071(a).
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Under the EAA, creation of a "limited open forum" would secure the
right of students, like those in Mergens and Garnett, to form a reli-
gious organization and hold meetings on school grounds.
With the passage of the EAA, Congress sought to extend the Wid-
mar decision to public secondary schools. Indeed, one of the bill's co-
sponsors stated:
A lot of people have criticized the Court for its decisions on the issue
of church and state . . . [b]ut the Court was right in Widmar, and
this bill seeks only to clarify and extend the law of that case a bit
.... What we seek to do by this amendment is make clear that the
same rule of law applies to students in our public secondary schools.
• . . This amendment will send a message to [school administrators]
that the law is clear: they are not to discourage students from
voluntary religious exercises, and they are not to discriminate against
religious student groups.33
Regardless of the purpose of the bill as envisioned by Senator Bump-
ers, courts have disagreed over when the dictates of the EAA should
apply. The confusion as to the EAA's applicability culminated in 1989
with a direct conflict between two federal circuits.
III. MERGENS V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WESTSIDE COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS
Westside High School is a public secondary school in Omaha, Ne-
braska.3 4 The school is federally funded and is controlled by the Board
of Education of Westside Community Schools.35 The students at
Westside may join various student groups and clubs, all of which meet
after school hours on school grounds.3 6 Participation in any of the
approximately thirty clubs does not affect the grade or academic
credit a student receives in any course.3 7
33. 130 CONG. REc. S8356 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers, Dem.,
Ark.). In addition, Sen. Levin, Dem., Mich., explained that he was "persuaded that the pending
amendment is constitutional in light of the Supreme Cout's decision in Widmar against Vincent.
This amendment merely extends a similar constitutional rule as enunciated by the Court in Wid-
mar to secondary schools." Id. at 8355.
34. Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools, 867 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
35. Id.
36. The students claimed several of the groups and clubs were noncurriculum-related, in-
cluding: "the Chess Club; Interact, a service club peripherally connected to Rotary Interna-
tional; Subsurfers, a club for students and community members interested in scuba diving; and
Zonta, the female counterpart to Interact." Id. at 1078.
37. Id. at 1077.
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Requests to form a Christian Bible Study Club to meet on campus
after school hours were denied by the school because, according to the
school board, all of the current activities were "curriculum related,"
and allowing a religious club would violate the establishment clause of
the first amendment.3" Until the students attempted to form the Chris-
tian Bible Study Club in January 1985, no club had ever been denied
access to the school.
39
The students brought suit in federal district court, alleging that
"their freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, and
freedom to exercise religion had been violated."' 4 The school board,
however, argued that all of the current activities were curriculum-re-
lated and, therefore, the EAA did not apply. The district court found
that the EAA did not apply, and therefore held that the students' first
amendment free speech and free exercise rights were not violated. 41
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district
court's findings:
Allowing such a broad interpretation of "curriculum-related" would
make the EAA meaningless. A school's administration could simply
declare that it maintains a closed forum and choose which student
clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs
to some broadly defined educational goal. At the same time the
administration could arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any
unfavored student club on the basis of speech content. This is exactly
the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the EAA. A
public secondary school cannot simply declare that it maintains a
closed forum and then discriminate against a particular student
group on the basis of the content of the speech of that group.4 2
The court determined the students had a right to form the Bible study
club under the EAA, since the school had created a limited open fo-
rum. Moreover, the court rejected the school board's argument that
even if the school had created a limited open forum, the establishment





42. Id. at 1078. The court also noted:
Congress did not intend for the EAA to be easily circumvented by administrative de-
cree. Many of the student clubs at WHS, including the chess club, are noncurriculum-
related. Therefore, WHS maintains a limited open forum, and the EAA forbids dis-
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The Mergens court held that the "EAA codifies the Supreme
Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent, extending that holding to sec-
ondary public schools." "[T]he only difference between the EAA
and Widmar is the EAA's express extension of the equal access princi-
ple to public secondary school students .... Any constitutional at-
tack on the EAA must therefore be predicated on the difference
between secondary school students and university students. '45 The
court examined this "difference" in light of the Widmar Court's
treatment of the Lemon test. The court accepted Congress' factual de-
termination that high school students, even though they are younger,
can distinguish between a policy of equal access and a policy of state
sponsorship: "Authors writing in leading legal periodicals have con-
sidered the issue and agree that students below the college age can
understand that an equal access policy is one of State neutrality to-
ward religion, not one of State favoritism." Moreover, the court
viewed Widmar as controlling, regardless of the EAA: "Indeed the
facts in the case before us today are the same as the facts in Widmar
except for the setting. Therefore, even if Congress had never passed
the EAA, our decision would be the same under Widmar alone."
47
Although the Eighth Circuit found little difference between univer-
sity students and high school students for equal access purposes, this
"difference" has resulted in a direct conflict between the Eighth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals over the constitutionality of an equal
access policy in public secondary schools.
IV. GARNETT v. RENTON SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 403
In Garnett, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a result in
direct conflict with the holding of the court in Mergens. The Garnett
court held: (1) that the EAA did not apply to the public high school
involved (Lindbergh High School) because it had not created a "lim-
ited open forum" under the Act 4 8 and (2) that in any event the estab-
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1080.
46. Id. at 1080 n.2 (quoting S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984)); see also 130
CONG. REC. S8357 (daily ed. June 27, 1984), where Sen. Durenberger, Repub., Minn., stated:
"However, as many experts acknowledge and the young students who testified showed, students
below college age can understand that an equal access policy is one of State neutrality toward
religion." But see Strossen, Constitutional Analysis of the Equal Access Act's Standards Gov-
erning Public Student Religious Meetings, 24 HAv. J. ON LEats. 117, 125 (1987) (Court has
repeatedly expressed the fear that young people may be more likely than adults "to perceive any
religious expression on school premises as manifesting the school's approval of religion." (foot-
note omitted)).
47. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1080.
48. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1989), petition
for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1989) (No. 89-641).
RELIGIOUS SPEECH
lishment clause prohibited the school from allowing a student-initiated
religious group to meet on campus at a time closely associated with
the school day. 49
Lindbergh High School is a public high school in the state of Wash-
ington.5 0 Three Lindbergh High students and one former student
brought action in federal district court against the Renton School Dis-
trict for its refusal to permit a student-initiated and student-led non-
denominational fellowship/Bible study group to meet on campus on
the same terms as other groups.51 The students claimed that the
school's policy violated their first amendment freedoms of speech,
free exercise of religion, and freedom from state hostility toward reli-
gion under the establishment clause.12 In addition, the students
claimed that their right to meet was secured by the EAA, since Lind-
bergh High had created a limited open forum by allowing various
other groups" to meet on campus . 4
The district court held that the students' rights under the first
amendment were not violated by the school district's policy. It also
found that because Lindbergh High School had not created a limited
open forum, the EAA did not apply." On review, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court that "all clubs at Lindbergh are related
to the school's curriculum. ' 5 6 Thus, no limited open forum existed
under the Act. The court held that one of the purposes of the Act was
to secure the right of local school districts to use discretion in deter-
mining "what is and what is not curriculum related.""
49. Id. at 610.
50. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (W.D. Wash. 1987),




53. The student groups permitted to meet on campus at that time included the bowling
club, ski club, dance squad, pep club, girls club, varsity club, and chess club. Id. at 1271.
54. Id. The students also raised a number of state constitutional claims which were disposed
of by the district court and not addressed on appeal. See id. at 1269, 1274-76.
55. Id. at 1270.
56. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1989), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1989) (No. 89-641). In its initial published opinion,
the court held that all of the clubs "directly relate to the high school curriculum defined by the
Renton School District." Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir.
1989) (emphasis supplied), amended and superseded, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1989) (No. 89-641).
57. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 614; see 130 CONG. REc. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (state-
ments of Sens. Gorton, Repub., Wash., and Hatfield, Repub., Or.):
MR. GORTON. Would the school district have the full authority to determine where
the line is to be drawn between curriculum-related activities and non-curriculum-re-
19901
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In determining the applicability of the Act, the court took care to
specifically examine the actions of the school district, rather than
blindly accepting the school district's pronouncements. "Complete
deference [to the school district] would render the Act meaningless be-
cause school boards could circumvent the Act's requirements simply
by asserting that all student groups are curriculum related.'"'" In Gar-
nett, however, the court gave greater deference to the school's judg-
ment than did the Eighth Circuit in Mergens. According to the Ninth
Circuit, the actions of Lindbergh High School indicated that all of the
clubs were too closely related to the school curriculum to be deemed
"noncurriculum related. "9
Since all of the clubs at Lindbergh High School were related to the
curriculum, the EAA did not apply. 60 The court, therefore, found it
unnecessary to decide the constitutionality of the Act. The court did,
however, address the constitutionality of allowing high school reli-
gious groups to meet on campus and whether such a right existed
apart from the Act, under the first amendment.
The court applied the three-part Lemon test to determine the consti-
tutionality of an equal access policy in public secondary schools. The
court held that while such a policy arguably might have a secular pur-
pose, it nevertheless failed both the second and third prongs of the
test.6
1
The court determined that allowing student religious groups to meet
on campus would have the primary effect of advancing religion, stat-
lated?
MR. HATFIELD. We in no way seek to limit that discretion.
MR. GORTON. So if the school district were to determine that the girls cheerleading
squad, for example, should be led by a teacher, it could make the determination that it
was curriculum-related.
MR. HATFIELD. Correct.
MR. GORTON. And, therefore, the existence of that group would not be a nonre-
lated forum?
MR. HATFIELD. Correct.
MR. GORTON. Could the school make the same determination with reference to a
chess club?
MR. HATFIELD. I would not say that no school district could, but I cannot readily
conceive of a criterion that could be used at this time to establish that as a curriculum-
related activity. I am not saying it could not be, because as long as you have lawyers,
they can find ways of doing things one way or another.
58. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 614. Arguably, the court's interpretation of "noncurriculum re-
lated" and "limited open forum" has, despite the court's language to the contrary, rendered the
Act ineffective.
59. Id. None of the clubs were student-initiated or student-directed, and all of them had
faculty advisers or teachers as sponsors. Thus, the court found that Lindergh High School had
not merely deemed all of its clubs to be curriculum-related. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 610.
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ing that "even insignificant amounts of direct aid to religious groups
violate the Establishment Clause." 62 The court relied on a long history
of case law prohibiting state action that amounted to sponsorship of
religion.63 Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Mergens, the Garnett court dis-
tinguished its case from Widmar, finding that a significant difference
exists between equal access on university campuses and equal access in
high schools. 4
Even absent the primary effect of advancing religion resulting from
an equal access policy, the court still would have found an establish-
ment clause violation based on an excessive entanglement between
church and state. 65 The court held that since high school student
groups must be supervised or monitored by government employees,
such monitoring "could lead to teacher interference with or advocacy
of religious activities." Because of this possibility, the court found
62. Id. But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) ("A Religious organization's
enjoyment of merely 'incidental' benefits does not violate the prohibition against the 'primary
advancement' of religion.") (relying on Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973)).
63. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Specifically, the court relied on other circuits which have considered the use of school facilities
for religious meetings and have held such use "to unconstitutionally advance religion." Garnett
v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1989) (No. 89-641); see May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School
Corp., 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th
Cir. 1985); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646
(1 th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1980).
64. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 611. "The potential for undue influence is far less significant with
regard to college students who voluntarily enroll in courses [than with regard to students at
public high schools]." Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 n.5 (1987)). In
support of this premise, the court pointed out that high school students are more impressionable
than university students and are required to attend school. The court again cited other circuit
court cases which have "uniformly held that public school prayer groups violate the Establish-
ment Clause." Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 612.
66. Id. But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 11 (citations omitted):
[Tihe University would risk greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its ex-
clusion of "religious worship" and "religious speech." Initially, the university would
need to determine which words and activities fall within "religious worship and teach-
ing." This alone could prove to be "an impossible task in an age where many and
various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of religion." There would also be a
continuing need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
The presence of a monitor at student meetings arguably is equivalent to the presence of a police-
man at a public religious rally. The potential for undue state interference or advocacy of religion
exists in both situations, but the latter is clearly permissible. See, e.g., O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Provision of police, sanitation and related public services is a
legitimate function of government and not an 'establishment' of religion.").
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that the establishment clause prohibited an equal access policy.6 7
Finally, the court addressed the student's free speech argument and
concluded that "[b]ecause the district has not created a public forum,
it may limit student expression in any reasonable way." ' 68 The school
district had a strict policy of allowing student groups to meet in high
school classrooms only after express district approval. 69 Concluding
that no limited open forum existed at Lindbergh High School, the
court did not find the school district's actions to be unreasonable. In
fact, in its view, the exclusion of religious groups was constitutionally
required.70
Again the court distinguished Widmar, first citing the differences
between high school and university students.71 Second, the court
opined that the university in Widmar, unlike the classrooms in Lind-
bergh High School, was a public forum for student expression. Thus,
even if Widmar applied to high schools, the court reasoned it would
not have controlled the outcome because of the lack of a limited open
forum at Lindbergh. 72
The court also refused to apply Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District:73 "The question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech-
the question we addressed in Tinker-is different from the question
whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to pro-
mote particular student speech." 7 4 The Ninth Circuit framed the issue
in Garnett as the permissible refusal of the school district to grant a
group the use of its classrooms, rather than a question of student free
speech rights. 75 Since the denial of access was not unreasonable, no
denial of free speech occurred. 76
V. RESOLVING THE EQUAL ACCESS CONTROVERSY
The United States Supreme Court should end the equal access con-
troversy by speaking to the three crucial issues: applicability of the
67. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 612.
68. Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 612.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id.
73. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Supreme Court upheld the right of a high school
student to wear a black armband in protest of the Vietnam War as a constitutionally protected
freedom of expression: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.





EAA, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech for high school stu-
dents.
The basic goal of Congress in enacting the EAA was to secure the
right of "noncurriculum" student groups, including religious groups,
to meet on campus." Legislative history of the Act reveals that Con-
gress intended "noncurriculum-related" student groups to be broadly
construed:
MR. GORTON: I gather from the previous remarks of the Senator
from Oregon and the Senator from Alabama that the definition of
these non-related student groups is fairly broad. The chess club
would be such a group. If the school permits a chess club, it has
thereby created the limited open forum which brings into effect the
proscriptions of the act.
MR. HATFIELD: That is correct.7 1
The existence of a chess club at the high school in Mergens was
compelling evidence to the Eighth Circuit of a limited open forum un-
der the EAA. 79 The Garnett court did not, however, find this same
evidence persuasive. Even though a chess club was one of the various
student groups which met on campus, the court held that no limited
open forum existed under the Act. 80 If, however, the chess club were
indeed curriculum-related as found by the Garnett court, then any stu-
dent activity, including a Bible study club, would also be curriculum-
related. As the Third Circuit has observed:
Another indication that the activity period is not curriculum-related
can be derived from the identity of some of the clubs presently
approved or approved in the past. For instance, the Key Club, a
service and community organization, has little direct relevance to
normal course offerings. Likewise, the Chess Club, the Aviation
Club, and the Office Aides, among others, have at best only
tangential relation to a high school course of study.
While it might be said that each of these activities enhances the
curricular goals of the school by promoting civic awareness (the Key
Club), logical thought (the Chess Club), practical applications of
scientific principles (Aviation Club), or a general sense of
responsibility (Office Aides), the same extended chain of reasoning
77. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984).
78. 130 CONG. REc. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statements of Sens. Gorton and Hat-
field).
79. Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools, 867 F.2d 1076, 1078-79
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
80. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 612.
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could be used to justify religion as a promoter of civic, social, and
intellectual values. '
The Ninth Circuit's contrary interpretation of "curriculum-related"
in Garnett renders the Act ineffective. Under such an interpretation,
local school districts have complete discretion to bar any student
group, solely on the basis of the content of the students' speech. Even
though none of the clubs are associated with a particular class and
students receive no academic credit for participation, the school dis-
trict could simply declare that all of the clubs are curriculum-related
and find, therefore, that the EAA does not apply.82
The interpretation reached by the district court in Garnett incor-
rectly defines curriculum simply as "what the local school board says
it is."3 The school district should not be permitted to exercise such
unfettered discretion in order to suppress the constitutionally pro-
tected free speech of its students. Once the school opens its doors to
use by even one noncurriculum student group, such as the chess club,
it may not discriminate against other noncurriculum student groups,
including religious student groups, because of the content of the stu-
dents' speech. The free exercise, establishment, and free speech
clauses of the first amendment, as well as the EAA, do not permit
such discrimination.
A. Establishment Clause Concerns
Analysis of the equal access controversy should focus on one prem-
ise-the state must protect religious speech and must strictly adhere to
a policy of state neutrality, rather than hostility, toward religious ex-
pression.8 "A frequent and conventional account of the establishment
81. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 549 n.18 (3d Cir. 1984), va-
cated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (citation omitted); see also School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (while a chess club may enhance the
curriculum goal of logical thought, the study of the Bible may similarly enhance the curriculum
goals of literature and history).
82. The court did note, however, that, "Lindbergh has not merely deemed all its clubs to be
curriculum related. Rather, Lindbergh and the school district have considered instructional
goals, and, in accordance with a written policy, made the clubs a part of Lindbergh's curricu-
lum." Garnett, 874 F.2d at 614.
83. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 1987),
aff'd, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16,
1989) (No. 89-641).
84. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 554, (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("The Establishment Clause mandates state neutrality, not hostility, toward
religion.").
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clause focuses on religious liberty." 5 The establishment clause is a
limitation on government action, not religious expression.8 6 The clause
restricts only religious speech by the state; the clause does not prohibit
religious speech by individuals. Because the establishment clause does
not permit state hostility toward religion, an equal access policy ap-
pears fully constitutional.
Violation of the establishment clause requires state action. In decid-
ing whether an equal access policy violates the establishment clause,
courts should first determine if sufficient state action exists to invoke
the clause.8 7 An equal access policy differs from the state policy at
issue in the school prayer cases. For example, in Engel v. Vitale8" and
Abington v. Schempp, 9 the Supreme Court struck down state statutes
requiring every student to participate in a state-sponsored prayer or a
state-directed Bible study. An equal access policy also lacks the level
of state action at issue in McCollum v. Board of Education,9 where
the Court struck down a state release program for students who at-
tended religious classes. 91 When a completely voluntary, student-initi-
ated religious group meets, the state does not engage in any religious
85. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONN. L. REv. 739, 740 (1986); see also Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 700 (1980); Merel, The Protection of Individ-
ual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CI. L.
REv. 805, 811 (1978); Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 720 (1968).
86. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987):
For a law to have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the
government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence ....
For the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the "establish-
ment" of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity.
Id. at 337 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
87. See Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in
Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499 (1983) ("Instead of trying a blanket prohibition on all
student-initiated religious activity in the high school, courts should focus on the character of the
activity and on whether the school board's involvement is sufficient to raise establishment clause
concerns.").
88. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (involving a state statute mandating a recitation of a daily prayer in
the classroom).
89. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (involving a state statute which required daily classroom readings
from the Bible).
90. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
91. Id. at 212. The Widmar Court distinguished McCollum:
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to student groups,
it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting
school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See,
e.g., McCollum v. Board of Education. In those cases the school may appear to spon-
sor the views of the speaker.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.10 (1981) (emphasis in original).
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activity. The state is not commanding every student to pray or read
the Bible. The meetings are not part of the school curriculum, and
they do not take place during the mandatory school day. Simply no
state sponsorship of religion occurs when a school adopts an equal
access policy.
Widmar should control the issue in Mergens. Westside High School
has created a forum which is open to various student groups. 92 The
Christian Bible Study Club is a student-initiated and completely vol-
untary group. These circumstances are essentially the same as in Wid-
mar, but at the high school level. Given virtually the same facts, the
Court should reach the same conclusion and uphold the constitution-
ality of an equal access policy in public high schools.
Just as in Widmar, two prongs of the Lemon test are met. An equal
access policy, whether at the university or high school level, has a sec-
ular purpose and does not entangle government with religion. The
Mergens court noted that in Widmar, the Supreme Court held that
"the policy has a secular purpose because one of the university's pur-
poses is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas between stu-
dents." 93 This analysis of the purpose prong of the Lemon test is
equally applicable at the high school level. That is, one of the pur-
poses of a public high school is to provide a forum for the exchange
of ideas between students. Justice Fortas expressed the importance of
this principle:
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools. The classroom is
peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
than through any kind of authoritative selection. 94
Given this view of the high school classroom, it has been argued that:
It is inconsistent to accept, on the one hand, a level of intellectual
sophistication among high school students sufficient to consider and
contribute to the exchange of controversial views and yet, on the
other hand, to declare them incapable of discerning the distinction
92. See Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools, 867 F.2d 1076, 1076-
77 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
93. Id. at 1079.
94. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quot-
ing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted)).
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between a school's creation of a public forum that may permit
religious speech and an endorsement of such activity.9
The Widmar Court's analysis of the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test should resolve any question of the constitutionality of an
equal access policy at the high school level:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of
"religious worship" and "religious speech." Initially, the University
would need to determine which words and activities fall within
"religious worship and religious teaching." This alone could prove
"an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet
the constitutional definition of religion." There would also be a
continuing need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance
with the rule.9
Similarly, if a high school were to ban religious groups from meeting
at the school, it would also "risk greater entanglement" by having to
determine which groups were in fact "religious" and which groups
simply talked about religion.
Under an entanglement analysis, the only apparent difference be-
tween equal access at the college level and equal access at the high
school level is that some high schools, such as the one in Mergens,
may require the presence of a monitor at the student meetings. How-
ever, even if school faculty members were required to attend meetings,
they would serve the same function as a police officer at a public
rally. The faculty monitor would simply enable the group to gain ac-
cess to the open forum and would not aid in the students' exercise of
religion. The faculty monitor would be at the meetings at the request
of the school, not the students, and would not participate. 97
The final prong of the Lemon test, whether the policy has the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion, is also resolved by applying Wid-
mar. The use of school facilities for student meetings is plainly a
benefit to the student religious group. However, the Supreme Court
has already declared such a benefit constitutional:
It is possible-perhaps even forseeable-that religious groups will
benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has
95. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 564-65 (1984) (Adams, J.,
dissenting).
96. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n. 11 (1981) (citations omitted).
97. In fact, any participation, however minimal, should merit close constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.
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explained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely
"incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the
"primary advancement" of religion. We are satisfied that any
religious benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be "incidental"
within the meaning of our cases. 9
Since "incidental benefits" to religious groups are constitutional, this
issue is already resolved. 99 To decide otherwise would be to depart
from Widmar.
The only difference between Widmar and Mergens is the difference
between the meeting of a religious student group on a university cam-
pus and such a meeting on a high school campus. Although the Wid-
mar Court's treatment of the Lemon test should be extended to the
high school level, some inherent differences between colleges and high
schools must be considered. Three basic differences are apparent: (1)
High school students are required to attend school by compulsory at-
tendance laws, making them a captive audience, while college students
attend voluntarily; (2) teachers at high schools are authority figures as
well as educators; and (3) high school students are younger and more
impressionable than college students. Upon closer inspection, these
differences are not significant enough to merit a departure from Wid-
mar.
All states have compulsory attendance laws requiring students to at-
tend school until they reach a certain age.' °0 Some concern exists that
students are a "captive audience" in the classroom and could be in-
doctrinated by the state.'0 1 However, in Board of Education v. Pico,102
the Supreme Court distinguished the compulsory setting of a class-
room and other situations that were not compulsory.'0 3 The threat of
state-sponsored indoctrination does not exist in the equal access con-
text because the religious meetings are completely voluntary and stu-
dent-initiated. In addition, the students in Mergens wished to meet
after school, when attendance is no longer compulsory. An after-
98. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273-74 (citations omitted).
99. The benefits received by the student group at a high school are essentially the same as
those received by a similar group at a university. Additionally, in terms of the burden on the
state, the use of a university classroom is no different from the use of a high school classroom.
100. See Note, Home Education v. Compulsory Attendance Laws: Whose Kids Are They
Anyway?, 24 WAsHBuRN L.J. 274, 278 n.50 (1985).
101. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) ("Families entrust public schools
with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the pri-
vate beliefs of the student and his or her family.").
102. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
103. Id. at 862. The only books at issue in Pico were library books. Thus, the Court noted
that its adjudiciation did not intrude into the compulsory courses offered by the school. Id.
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hours religious group is not a required part of the school's curricu-
lum. Because the student religious groups are strictly voluntary, the
"captive audience" concern arguably does not exist.
Second, some concern exists that because of their positions of au-
thority, the state-required teacher-monitor might unduly influence the
students. The monitor's presence, however, would be strictly nonpar-
ticipatory, and only at the request of the school. Additionally, as one
court observed, "today's high school students are surprisingly sophis-
ticated, intelligent, and discerning. They are far from easy prey for
even the most forcefully expressed, cogent, and persuasive words."'04
A non-teacher adult employed by the school (a school custodian, for
example) could monitor the meetings, thereby alleviating any fear of
undue influence. Finally, since the administration would instruct the
monitor not to participate in the student group, it must be assumed
that the monitor will heed those instructions. To assume otherwise
would be to undermine the credibility of teachers.
The third difference, involving the higher impressionability of high
schools students, deserves close examination. The Supreme Court
raised the issue of age difference between college students and
younger students 05 in a footnote in Widmar: "University students
are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than
younger students and should be able to appreciate that the university's
policy is one of neutrality toward religion." °0
Justice Powell, author of the majority's opinion in Widmar, also
addressed this issue in his dissent in Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District.10 7 Justice Powell stated: "I do not believe-particu-
104. Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Or. 1976).
105. Although younger students at the junior high and elementary age are more impression-
able than high school students, a similar argument could be made for equal access on those
levels. For example, the Supreme Court in Tinker held that junior high school students have the
right to protest the Vietnam War. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969). If a junior high or elementary school opened its facilities for use by other student groups,
the school might be unable to deny voluntary, student-initiated religious groups the use of the
same facilities.
Because the Court in Mergens is not faced with this issue, it may avoid the question alto-
gether. Extracurricular student groups are much more prevalent in high school than in junior
high or elementary school, so the problem may never even arise. One possible solution if it did
arise, however, would be for the Court to simply draw a line between high school aged students
and younger students. A line of maturity is often drawn by society (e.g., driving age of sixteen)
and by the Court. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2695 (1988) (drawing line
for capital punishment at age sixteen). Drawing a line between high school students and younger
students for equal access purposes would be just another instance where line-drawing is neces-
sary. See also Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High School Stu-
dent's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEo. L.J. 135, 152 (1983).
106. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981).
107. 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
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larly in this age of massive media information-that the few years dif-
ference in age between high school and college students justifies
departing from Widmar." 0°
Nevertheless, in Garnett'9 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because
high school students are more impressionable than college students, °10
the presence of a faculty member at the meetings and the use of
school facilities by the religious groups may give the impression of
state sponsorship of the group. However, the weight of authority dic-
tates that high school students are sufficiently mature to understand
that an equal access policy is one of state neutrality toward religion."'
One commentator observed that it "strains credulity to believe that an
adolescent who saw a student leader praying in a classroom reserved
by the student would assume that the student was praying because he
was expected to pray, rather than because he wanted to pray." 2
In James v. Board of Education,"3 the Second Circuit held that a
school district could not discharge a teacher for wearing a black arm-
band in protest of the Vietnam War." 4 "It does not appear from the
record that any student believed the armband to be anything more
than a benign symbolic expression of the teacher's personal views.""'
Thus, the court determined that the high school students were mature
enough to differentiate between state sponsorship of the protest and
the personal views of the teacher. Logic dictates that if students are
mature enough to distinguish between the personal views of a teacher
and the views of the school board, then they are mature enough to
understand that an equal access policy is an accommodation, rather
than an endorsement, of religion.
In addition, even if high school students are more impressionable
than older students, as the Garnett court reasoned, the state should be
especially careful not to give any appearance of hostility toward reli-
108. Id. at 556; see also Note, supra note 87, at 507 ("Research in the field of adolescent
psychology suggests that high school students are generally independent and capable of initial
inquiry.").
109. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1989), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1989) (No. 89-641).
110. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
111. See Loewy, School Prayer, Neutrality, and the Open Forum: Why We Don't Need a
Constitutional Amendment, 61 N.C.L. REV. 141 (1982); Note, supra note 87; Note, supra note
105.
112. Loewy, supra note 111, at 147.
113. 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. at 575. Other courts have similarly allowed teacher and student protest in the class-
room. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969) (wearing a
black armband in protest of Vietnam War protected); Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469
F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir.) (refusal to salute flag protected), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
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gion. Regarding the impressionability of high school students, at least
one judge has noted that the exclusion of student religious groups
would "introduce content-based restrictions in an otherwise open fo-
rum that may in fact be understood as a manifestation of official hos-
tility towards religion." 1 16 Judge Adams further stated:
It is well settled that the First Amendment proscribes governmental
hostility towards religion, as well as governmental promotion of
religion. ... [A] policy singling out a religious group as the only
student activity ever to be barred in the high school's history ...
raise[s] First Amendment problems of perceived government
disapproval of religion. " '
Just as the state may not sponsor religion, the state may not be
hostile to religion. Religious freedom and liberty will best be secured
through an equal access policy. Justice Douglas stated in Zorach v.
Clauson:"5 "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being." In Zorach, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a student release program for the religious instruction of the stu-
dents. The Court held that public schools can make adjustments in
their schedules to accommodate the religious needs of their students;
to do otherwise would read a "philosophy of hostility" into the Bill
of Rights." 9 As Justice Black stated in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, the first amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its rela-
tions with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.' ' 20 By sin-
gling out religious student groups and prohibiting them from meeting
on school grounds, schools are likely to send a message of hostility
toward religion. The relevant question should be "whether a more im-
pressionable secondary school student would more likely perceive a
limited forum policy as state sponsorship of religion, or perceive a
policy that grants privileges to all forms of speech except religious
speech as state disapproval of religion."'' The exclusion of the reli-
gious group in Mergens is likely to send a message of state hostility
116. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 565 (1984) (Adams, J., dis-
senting).
117. Id.
118. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); see also R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982)
(general discussion of the historically close association between church and state in American
society).
119. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315.
120. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
121. Note, supra note 105, at 155.
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towards religion. A policy of equal treatment for all student groups
does not send a message of state sponsorship of religion.
Under Widmar, the first amendment requires equality of access to a
limited public forum. The fact that other student groups meet on a
high school campus is evidence of the existence of a limited public
forum. The students in these various groups do not receive academic
credit and are not substantially financed by the school. Schools may
not discriminate against religious speech. 122 Although such discrimina-
tion is rooted in fear of an establishment clause violation,' 23 it is none-
theless discrimination. A school must base the restriction of its
students' freedom of expression on more than the mere possibility of
an establishment clause violation; the school officials may not act in a
particular manner simply to avoid a potential controversy. 24
One final aspect of the establishment clause analysis deserves atten-
tion. Justice O'Connor's reformulation of the Lemon test into the
"endorsement test" has received much attention and may possibly be
the future standard for any establishment clause analysis. 25 Delineat-
ing the test in Lynch v. Donnelly,126 and restating it in Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 27 Justice O'Connor has focused on government endorsement of
122. Religious speech deserves the full protection of the free speech clause. "[R]eligious wor-
ship and discussion . . . are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amend-
ment." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
123. Any lingering establishment clause concerns may be alleviated by the school posting a
simple disclaimer. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980);
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); American Civil Liberties Union v. Wilkin-
son, 701 F. Supp. 1296, 1312 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
In Wilkinson, the court wrote that if "the ultimate issue is whether government has endorsed a
religion, that fact should be able to be settled by a disclaimer in almost every instance. Disclaim-
ers are a common device in modern life." Id.
124. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
("action of the school authorities appears to have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the
controversy which might result from the expression"). Congress has expressed concern over this
problem: "A major result of the legal confusion is that school authorities, wishing to avoid legal
controversy, have often dramatically restricted student rights." S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1984).
125. See Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and
the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 151 (1987); Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Po-
tential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1049 (1986); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L.
REv. 266 (1987).
126. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The relevant issue is whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the stat-
ute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."). Justice O'Connor's
"objective observer" standard has been criticized as "incomprehensible." See Marshall, "We
Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 537
(1986).
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religion: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message. ' 12 Thus, under the endorsement test, the establishment
clause is violated "when the government makes adherence to religion
relevant to a person's standing in the political community."'' 29 The
purpose prong of the Lemon test becomes a question of the subjective
intent of the government: "whether the government intends to convey
a message of endorsement or disapproval."' 30 Similarly, the proper
inquiry under the effects prong of Lemon is whether the government
practice has "the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion."'' Although the Court has
not yet adopted the endorsement test per se, it has cited it favora-
bly. 132
Applying the endorsement test to the Mergens equal access issue,
the initial question is whether the government intended to convey a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion by implementing
an equal access policy. As the legislative history of the EAA makes
clear, the government did not intend to endorse religion. The very
name of the Act indicates that equality, not endorsement, was the
goal. Moreover, the denial of access to religious student groups by
school districts indicates a government purpose of disapproval of re-
ligion, as only religious student groups are prohibited from using
school facilities.
As to the effect of an equal access policy little, if any, support exists
for the notion that equality among student groups would indicate
state endorsement of a particular group. Since a school allows various
student groups to meet on campus, the primary appearance given by
not permitting a religious group to meet is one of hostility. The school
setting is a limited open forum, allowing expression of ideas by all
students. If a religious student group were the only group permitted to
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3102-04
(1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 389 (1985).
Justice Kennedy, however, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Scalia, criticized the test, writing that the "endorsement test is flawed in its fundamentals
and unworkable in practice." County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1990]
392 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 17:369
meet on campus, then the policy would clearly have the effect of en-
dorsing religion. Mergens shows that this is not the case.
The establishment clause demands state neutrality, not state hostil-
ity, toward religion. An equal access policy would meet this demand.
While a state may not prohibit access based on the establishment
clause, a state may allow access to high schools for religious student
groups. Indeed, if other noncurriculum-related groups are allowed ac-
cess, the state must allow such access; it is required to do so not only
by the establishment clause, but also by both the free speech and free
exercise clauses of the first amendment.
B. Free Exercise and Free Speech Concerns
Public high school students seeking to use school facilities as a reli-
gious group have a right to do so under the free exercise and free
speech clauses of the first amendment. Although "the First Amend-
ment rights of students in public schools 'are not automatically coex-
tensive with the rights of adults in other settings,"' 33 students cannot
be restricted from expressing their personal views unless those views
are somehow disruptive to the "basic educational mission" of the
school. 3 4 To deny access to student religious groups under the circum-
133. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (quoting Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
134. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). An additional concern
is that by granting access to a religious student group, a school would also have to grant access
to various other student groups, such as a Neo-Nazi or Ku Klux Klan group. Congress used the
term "political" in the EAA. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). Thus, if a school opened its doors to
extracurricular student groups, it could not discriminate on the basis of the content of the stu-
dents' speech. Frankly, granting access to such groups might be a politically unpopular decision
for the local school board to make. However, as Justice Kennedy recently wrote:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make
them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we
see them, compel the result. And so great is our commitment to the process that,
except in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for
the fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. This is one of
those rare cases.
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reversing conviction
under Texas flag-burning statute); see also Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 55
(1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("consequences of rigorously enforcing the guarantees of the
First Amendment are frequently unpleasant").
The school board could, however, impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on
the groups. Also, the students could be prohibited from disrupting the school. Under Fraser,
punishment of disruptive speech is permissible. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. Further, any violent or
unlawful acts could also be punished. Finally, if the meeting of the unpopular groups resulted in
a "hostile audience" problem, the school may have grounds to restrict the speech. See, e.g.,
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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stances contemplated by the EAA would be an unconstitutional con-
tent-based exclusion of religious speech. 35
The seminal case on the free speech rights of high school students is
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.3 6 In
Tinker, two high school students (ages 15 and 16) and one junior high
school student (age 13) were suspended from school for wearing black
armbands in protest of the "hostilities in Vietnam. ' 13 7 The students
filed suit to enjoin disciplinary action by the school, but the district
court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the action of the
school authorities was constitutional on the ground that it was reason-
able in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline.' 3 An equally
divided Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.13 9
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the wearing of arm-
bands in the circumstances of this case . . . was closely akin to 'pure
speech' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive
protection under the First Amendment."' 14 The Court reasoned:
"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." 141 The Court continued:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would "materially and substantilly interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the
prohibition cannot be sustained. 42
135. By requiring, inter alia, that a group's meetings "not materially and substantially inter-
fere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school," the EAA disposes of
the possibility that an expression of views might disrupt the school's "basic educational mis-
sion." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (Supp. 1988).
136. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
137. Id. at 504.
138. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa
1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
139. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en
banc), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
140. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
141. Id. at 506.
142. Id. at 509.
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The Supreme Court has departed from the Tinker standard on only
two occasions. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,143 the Su-
preme Court held that a high school newspaper published by students
was subject to censorship by the school administration. '44 The newspa-
per was written and edited by the Journalism II class at Hazelwood
East High School in St. Louis County, Missouri. The Journalism II
course was part of the regular curriculum at the high school. The stu-
dents "received grades and academic credit for their performance in
the course," which was "taught by a faculty member during regular
class hours.' ' 45 In addition, the school board had allocated funds for
the printing of the newspaper.'" The publication of the student news-
paper "was to be part of the educational curriculum and a 'regular
classroom activit[y] . ' ' ' 47
In holding that the school had authority to exercise "editorial con-
trol over the style and content of the student speech"' 14 in the student
newspaper, the Court distinguished Tinker:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in
Tinker-is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.
The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a
student's personal expression that happens to occur on school
premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over
school-sponsored publications. 49
The Hazelwood Court drew a distinction between the school-spon-
sored activity of publishing the school newspaper and the nonschool-
sponsored activity of the student protest in Tinker.
The Court in Hazelwood grounded its opinion on Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser,s0 where the Court held the school was per-
mitted to discipline a student for delivering an "offensively lewd and
143. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
144. Id. at 272.
145. Id.at 268.
146. Id. at 262. The printing expenses during the school year totaled $4,668.50, offset by
sales of $1,166.84. Other costs, such as supplies, textbooks, and a portion of the teacher's sal-
ary, were paid by the school board. Id.
147. Id. at 268.
148. Id. at 273.
149. Id. at 270.
150. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Fraser, the Court held that a student did not have the right to
deliver a speech that was sexually explicit (though not legally obscene) at an official school as-
sembly. The determination of whether this speech was acceptable in a school assembly rested
with the local school board. Id. at 683.
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indecent speech.""'' The Court focused on the "marked distinction
between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sex-
ual content of respondent's speech in this case.1 1 2 Thus, the school
was entitled "to disassociate itself [from the speech] to make the point
to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsis-
tent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education."'
Tinker dictates that the free speech rights of the students in Mer-
gens be protected. Unlike the situations in Hazelwood and Fraser, the
equal access policy in Mergens is compatible with the "basic educa-
tional mission"' 4 of a school. Meeting as a student religious group is
simply the "student's personal expression that happens to occur on
school premises.""' The disruptive speech in Fraser formed the basis
for the Court's restriction on the first amendment rights of the stu-
dent. This would not, however, provide a basis for a similar holding
in Mergens. Unless, as a result of the student meetings, widespread
protest and disruption of the school atmosphere occurred, the reason-
ing in Fraser should not apply, especially since the school's denial of
equal access is not a punishment of disruptive conduct.
The reasoning of the Court in Hazelwood is particularly important
in analyzing Mergens. In Hazelwood, the Court rested its determina-
tion that the school newspaper was subject to censorship upon the fact
that the newspaper was part of the school curriculum; that is, the
newspaper was a "curriculum related" activity. The journalism class
was taught by a member of the faculty, met during regular class
hours, and was funded by the school board. In addition, the students
received credit for the course. Mergens presents a different situation.
The group meetings would not be part of the school curriculum;
rather they would be completely voluntary and no academic credit
would be given. The presence of a faculty member at the meetings
would be only at the insistence of the school board, and the teacher's
role would be limited to that of a safety monitor. Thus, the meetings
would be "noncurriculum related" and the state would lack the requi-
site Hazelwood link to censor the speech of the students.
Reasonable regulation of student speech under Tinker is valid. Cer-
tain time, place and manner restrictions certainly would be reasona-
ble.5 6 The complete denial of access to a religious student group is
151. Id. at 685.
152. Id. at 680.
153. Id. at 685-86.
154. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.
155. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
156. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969). A
student may not materially disrupt classwork or substantially invade the rights of others. Id.
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not, however, a reasonable restriction-it is discrimination based
solely on the content of the students' speech. But for the religious
content of their speech, the students would be permitted to meet. The
students should be entitled to the same right as any other student
group: the right to use the school facilities.
The Supreme Court should recall its language in Tinker:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are
"persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect .... In the absence
of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate
their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views. 117
No "constitutionally valid reason" exists under the establishment
clause to prohibit student religious groups from meeting in public high
schools. The purpose of the free exercise and establishment clauses is
to guarantee religious liberty. The purpose of the free speech clause is
to prevent government suppression of ideas. Equal access secures both
of these fundamental rights. It should, therefore, be an easy question
for the Court. Freedom of thought and expression, not government
control, are fundamental to the first amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has an opportunity in Mergens v. Board of Ed-
ucation of Westside Community Schools to resolve the controversy
surrounding equal access policies in public secondary schools in favor
of freedom of speech and religion. The rights of the individual high
school students should be protected from content-based speech dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court's cases interpreting the first amend-
ment require that state regulation of speech be content neutral. In
Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403, but for the religious con-
tent of the students' speech, the students would have been permitted
to meet on school grounds. Currently, students may meet after school
hours on school grounds to play chess or play with computers. High
school students may also protest the operations of government. They
may, however, be prevented from discussing religion. This is an un-
reasonable restriction of student speech.
157. Id. at 511.
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The Supreme Court should extend its holding in Widmar v. Vincent
to the high school level. Logic dictates such an extension, and the
principles of justice and fairness require it. To fail to do so would
permit state hostility toward religion, where state neutrality is re-
quired. The students simply seek the same rights as any other student
group-to use the school facilities to hold meetings. The state's in-
fringement upon the students' right to equal access merits a remedy
from the Supreme Court.

